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HEALTH CARE REFORM: TREATMENT EFFECTIVENESS 
INFORMATION NATIONWIDE 
Robert B Leflar

 
Most of the debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) and its implementation has centered on access issues: expansion 
of access to care among the uninsured and underinsured through insurance 
reforms. True enough, increasing access to care is the law’s chief goal. But 
the law’s architects and the new programs’ builders aspired to broader ob-
jectives. They also sought to advance health care quality and to restrain 
health care inflation by helping rationalize the practice of medicine. 
This paper focuses on the law’s attempts, largely ignored in the nation-
al debate, to reduce the amount of non-productive, expensive waste in 
American health care practices, enabling us to deploy our limited resources 
on what actually improves people’s health. 
It is clear from comparative international statistics (see Figures 1 and 2) that 
virtually every other advanced nation operates its health care system with 
greater efficiency than we operate ours. Further, health care costs have been 
rising in the United States far more quickly than inflation generally, so that 
an average family of four paid $5,800 for health insurance in 1999, but just 
fourteen years later paid more than $16,000 (Figure 3)—an inflation rate far 
outstripping health cost increases in other countries.  (Thankfully, the rate of 
increase of health care inflation seems to be abating recently.)1 International 
price comparisons for particular procedures and drugs bring home the radi-
cal cost differences to patients needing those procedures or drugs: Ameri-
cans pay far more than patients in other advanced nations.2 
 
 
 
* Ben J. Altheimer Professor of Legal Advocacy, University of Arkansas School of 
Law, Fayetteville, Ark.; Professor, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock; 
rbleflar@uark.edu. I thank the UALR Law Review editors for organizing the February 2014 
symposium on the Affordable Care Act at which I gave the presentation on which this article 
is based, Lauren Summerhill for dedicated research assistance, and Frank Griffin, Doug 
Kamerow, and Mick Tilford for their useful suggestions. 
 1. See, e.g., David Blumenthal et al., Health Care Spending─A Giant Slain or Sleep-
ing?, 369 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2551, 2551 (2013) (observing slower growth in health care costs 
in 2012 but concluding continued cost control efforts are needed). 
 2. See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, The $2.7 Trillion Medical Bill: Colonoscopies Ex-
plain Why U.S. Leads the World in Health Expenditures, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2013, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/02/health/colonoscopies-explain-why-us-leads
-the-world-in-health-expenditures.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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Fig. 1. Percentage of Gross Domestic Product Spent on Health Care, 2012.3 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Health Care Expenditures per Person-Year, 2011.4 
 
 
 
 3. Quick Reports, Global Health Expenditure Database, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://apps.who.int/nha/database/Key_Indicators/Index/en (last visited Sept. 18, 2014); Coun-
tries: Sri Lanka, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/countries/lka/en/ (last visited 
November 12, 2014). 
 4. OECD Indicators, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2013, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & 
DEV., at  155 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/Health-at-a-Glance-2013.pdf. 
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Fig. 3. Average Annual Premiums for Single and Family Coverage, 
1999−2013.5 
 
What do we get for what we spend? In comparison with other coun-
tries, the picture in public health terms looks mostly, but not entirely, bleak.6 
The figures below depict several dimensions on which health outcomes can 
be compared. These are measures to which the quality of the health care 
systems contributes some, but not all, of the differences among nations.7 
Perhaps the most disturbing is Figure 9, depicting the relative improvement 
among leading nations over a 20-year period in life expectancy at birth. The 
United States rests at the bottom. 
 
 
 5. Average Annual Premiums for Single and Family Coverage, 1999−2013, HENRY J. 
KAISER FAM. FOUND., http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/2013-ehbs-
1-11.png (last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
 6. See, e.g., Karen Davis et al., Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of 
the U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally, COMMONWEALTH FUND, at 7 (2014), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2014/jun/mirror-mirror (rank-
ing the U.S. “last or near last” among eleven advanced nations on dimensions of health care 
performance such as health outcomes, access, efficiency, and equity). 
 7. For some measures, such as infant mortality and life expectancy at birth, a country’s 
educational level, dietary practices, extent of income inequality, and other environmental 
factors contribute as well. 
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Fig. 4. Infant Mortality Rates, Internationally and by State.8 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Hospital Admission Rates for Diabetes Complications.9 
 
 
 8. T.J. Mathews & Marian F. MacDorman, Infant Mortality Statistics from the 2009 
Period Linked Birth/Infant Death Data Set, NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., at 1, 17 (Jan. 24, 2013), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr61/nvsr61_08.pdf (state comparisons); 
The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (2012), available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html (international compari-
sons). In addition to the quality of health care systems, other factors such as nutrition, educa-
tion, and relative income inequality contribute to these statistics. 
 9. OECD Indicators, supra note 2, at 109. 
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Fig. 6. In-Hospital Mortality for Acute Myocardial Infarction (Heart At-
tacks).10 
 
 
Fig. 7. Breast Cancer 5-year Relative Survival Rates.11 
 
 
 10. OECD Indicators, HEALTH AT A GLANCE 2011, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & 
DEV., at 109 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/49105858.pdf (Fig. 5.3.1). 
 11. Id. at 121 (Figure 5.9.2). 
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Fig. 8. Life Expectancy at Birth, 2011.12 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 9. Increase in Life Expectancy at Birth, 1988-2008.13 
 
The conclusion that must be drawn from these comparative statistics is 
that America spends enormous quantities of money on health care, far more 
 
 12. OECD, OECD Factbook 2014: Economic, Environmental, and Social Statistics, 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., at 237 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/factbook-
2014-en. 
 13. OECD, OECD Health Data 2010 (2010), reproduced in Gerard F. Anderson & Pa-
tricia Markovich, Multinational Comparisons of Health Systems Data 2010, COMMON-
WEALTH FUND, at 61 (2010). 
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than any other nation, but a substantial proportion of that massive amount of 
spending does little if any good.14 Excess administrative costs, duplicative 
lab tests, unnecessary procedures and diagnostics, procedures to repair pre-
vious mistakes, the list goes on: American health care is replete with high-
cost, low-value services.15 Certainly, at the top level, the quality of sophisti-
cated health care in the United States is frequently second to none. But for 
what we pay, looking at national health outcomes statistics, on the whole we 
are not getting a good return on our investment. As the Institute of Medicine 
recently concluded, “[t]he growth rate of health care expenditures is unsus-
tainable, with waste that diverts major resources from necessary care and 
other priorities at every level─individual, family, community, state, and 
national.”16 
What are the reasons for the inefficiency and limited effectiveness of 
our health care system? There are many. As Dr. Dan Rahn observed in his 
keynote presentation at this symposium, “Systems are perfectly designed to 
get the results they get.”17 Perhaps the most important structural reason is 
that up to now, the amount of payment that providers receive for their ser-
vices and that medical product merchants receive for their products has de-
pended chiefly on quantity, not quality. What matters financially is the 
amount of services and products provided, not the health outcomes for pa-
tients.18 Since physicians control most health care purchasing decisions, and 
they have not been constrained in most health care settings by cost consider-
ations, incentives for excessive diagnostic tests and other procedures are 
built into the system. 
Atul Gawande’s provocative article, “The Cost Conundrum,” depicted 
how in some areas a culture of profit rather than professionalism has come 
to dominate local health care.19 Gawande focused on the second-highest-cost 
metropolitan area in the U.S.—McAllen, Texas of all places—and compared 
 
 14. See generally U.S. HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: SHORTER LIVES, 
POORER HEALTH, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (Steven H. Woolf & Laudan Aron eds., 
2013), available at http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2013/US-Health-in-International-Perspective
-Shorter-Lives-Poorer-Health.aspx. 
 15. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, BEST CARE AT LOWER COST: THE PATH TO CONTINUOUSLY 
LEARNING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 101−05 (Mark Smith et al. eds., 2013). The Institute of 
Medicine’s prestigious history as an authoritative source of information on health care policy 
lends particular weight to its conclusions about waste in health care expenditures. 
 16. Id. at 14, 104. 
 17. Dr. Rahn, Chancellor, Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., Keynote Address at the Univer-
sity of Arkansas at Little Rock Ben J. Altheimer Symposium on the Affordable Care Act 
(Feb. 28, 2014) (quoting Dr. Paul Batalden of Dartmouth Medical School and the Institute for 
Health Improvement). 
 18. See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 25. 
 19. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36, avail-
able at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/01/the-cost-condundrum. 
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it to El Paso, another Texas border city similar in demographics, income, 
and medical facilities. Critically ill Medicare patients in McAllen received 
almost 50% more specialist visits than in El Paso. McAllen patients got 
“thirty per cent more bone-density studies, sixty per cent more stress tests 
with echocardiography, . . . and five hundred and fifty per cent more urine-
flow studies to diagnose prostate troubles.”20 McAllen patients got two to 
three times as many cardiac procedures such as pacemaker and defibrillator 
implants, cardiac bypass operations, and coronary artery stents. Those dif-
ferences in number of treatments and amount of costs could not be ex-
plained by differences in the patients’ conditions. Gawande’s conclusion: 
“The primary cause of McAllen’s extreme costs was, very simply, the 
across-the-board overuse of medicine.”21 
McAllen is but one striking example of how medical practice in the 
United States is driven to a large degree by forces other than sound scientific 
evidence.22 Instances abound of practice variations that cannot be explained 
by medical logic or differences in patient health status. As John Wennberg 
and his colleagues at Dartmouth proved years ago, what treatment a patient 
will get for a given condition often varies tremendously from one geograph-
ical location to another.23 These irrational practice variations in the Medicare 
program indicate that considerable expenditures could be saved by the elim-
ination of scientifically unsupported services.24 The practice variations per-
 
 20. Id. at 38−39. 
 21. Id. at 39. For non-Medicare privately insured patients, the cost disparity between 
McAllen and El Paso seems much less severe, though it still exists. See generally Luisa Fran-
zini et al., McAllen and El Paso Revisited: Medicare Variations Not Always Reflected in the 
Under-Sixty-Five Population, 29 HEALTH AFF. 2302 (2010). 
 22. The Institute of Medicine has concluded that less than half of all treatments provided 
to American patients are based on clear scientific evidence. Report Brief, Initial National 
Priorities for Comparative Effectiveness Research, INST. OF MED. (2009), www.iom.edu
/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2009/ComparativeEffectivenessResearchPriorities/CER%20r
eport%20brief%2008-13-09.ashx; MICHAEL CHERNEW & MARK FENDRICK, LEARNING WHAT 
WORKS BEST: THE NATION’S NEED FOR EVIDENCE ON COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS IN 
HEALTH CARE (Institute of Medicine ed., March, 2007). 
 23. See, e.g., John E. Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health 
Care Delivery: A Population-Based Health Information System Can Guide Planning and 
Regualtory Decision-Making, 182 SCI. 1102 (1973); see generally The Trustees of Dartmouth 
College, Understanding of the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Health Care System, THE 
DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ (indicating extensive 
practice variations persist today); see, e.g., Report to the Congress, Regional Variation in 
Medicare Service Use, MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (January, 2011), 
http://www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/Jan11_RegionalVariation_report.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
 24. See, e.g., JOHN E. WENNBERG, TRACKING MEDICINE: RESEARCHER’S QUEST TO 
UNDERSTAND HEALTH CARE 5 (Oxford University Press 2010) (40% savings estimate); Elliott 
S. Fisher, Medical Care—Is More Always Better? 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1665 (2003) (30% 
savings estimate). The cost effectiveness of inpatient care for acute myocardial infarctions 
(heart attacks), for example, ranges across hospitals from about $5,000 per life year saved to 
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sist in some cases because of the lack of good evidence for the superiority of 
one treatment modality over alternative treatments, and in other cases de-
spite clear evidence that one treatment is preferable.25 Sometimes the varia-
tions are influenced by financial conflicts of interest, as when a physician 
has a stake in an imaging center or receives payments or other values from 
medical products companies.26 One recent report, for instance, found that 
for-profit dialysis chains use significantly more injectable medications com-
pared to nonprofits, at higher costs, but their patients have a higher risk of 
dying.27 Another study indicated that a high-cost, high-reimbursement hip 
fracture fixation device has largely displaced an older, cheaper, and safer 
method among younger orthopedic surgeons.28 A broad-based study of drug 
effectiveness suggested that many older drugs, generally available now in 
cheaper generic form, outpaced newer (and more expensive) drugs in effec-
tiveness terms.29 As the Institute of Medicine concluded, “[t]he prevailing 
approach to paying for health care, based predominantly on individual ser-
vices and products, encourages wasteful and ineffective care.”30 
 
more than $100,000. Dana Goldman et al., Harnessing the Promise of Comparative Effec-
tiveness Research, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Sept. 12, 2012), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/
2012/09/12/harnessing-the-promise-of-comparative-effectiveness-research/; cf. Andrew J. 
Rettenmaier & Zijun Wang, Regional Variations in Medical Spending and Utilization: A 
Longitudinal Analysis of US Medicare Population, 21 HEALTH ECON. 67, 80−81 (2012) (oth-
er scholars offering lower savings estimates). 
 25. See, e.g., Justin W. Timbie et al., Five Reasons That Many Comparative Effective-
ness Studies Fail to Change Patient Care and Clinical Practice, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2168, 2168 
(2012) (“translating evidence into changes in clinical practice is rarely rapid”). 
 26. See, e.g., Marc A. Rodwin, Institutional Corruption and the Pharmaceutical Policy, 
41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 544 (2013); Sunita Sah & Adriane Fugh-Berman, Physicians under 
the Influence: Social Psychology and Industry Marketing Strategies, 41 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
665, 666−67 (2013). 
 27. Yi Zhang et al., Organizational Status of Dialysis Facilities and Patient Outcome: 
Does Higher Injectable Medication Use Mediate Increased Mortality? 48 HEALTH SERVICES 
RES. 949, 964 (2013). 
 28. See Jeffrey O. Anglen & James N. Weinstein, Nail or Plate Fixation of Intertro-
chanteric Hip Fractures: Changing Pattern of Practice, 90 J. BONE & JOINT SURGERY 700 
(2008). See also Peter Whoriskey & Dan Keating, Spinal Fusions Serve as Case Study for 
Debate over When Certain Surgeries Are Necessary, WASH. POST, Oct. 27, 2013, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/spinal-fusions-serve-as-case-study-for-
debate-over-when-certain-surgeries-are-necessary/2013/10/27/5f015efa-25ff-11e3-b3e9-
d97fb087acd6_story.html (reporting on rise in expensive spinal fusion surgeries despite 
sparse evidence of superiority over alternative cheaper treatments). 
 29. See Sharon Begley, New Drugs Trail Many Old Ones in Effectiveness Against Dis-
ease, REUTERS, June 3, 2013, available at www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USL2N0EC1
E720130603 (reporting on Mark Olfson & Steven C. Marcus, Decline in Placebo-Controlled 
Trial Results Suggests New Directions for Comparative Effectiveness Research, 32 HEALTH 
AFF. 1116 (2013)). 
 30. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 25. 
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In response to concerns about high-cost, low-value care, a significant 
movement is gaining steam to shift from a “pay-for-volume” approach to a 
“pay-for-performance” approach.31 This shift is backed by the Affordable 
Care Act’s provisions encouraging the formation of “Accountable Care Or-
ganizations” (ACOs), which are physician-led entities, physician-hospital 
partnerships, and hospital-led partnerships that are rewarded by Medicare 
for meeting targets of high-quality care and outcomes for the patients at-
tributed to them, while keeping the cost of caring for those patients within 
benchmarks set in advance.32 Initial results indicate that ACOs have 
achieved significant cost savings, and the number of ACOs has risen rapidly 
since the new law’s enactment.33 Concerns do exist on the one hand that 
federal quality standards may be unrealistically strict,34 and on the other that 
the emphasis on cost savings may compromise quality of care and that some 
ACOs may attempt to meet their targets by discouraging sicker patients 
from seeking treatment at their facilities.35 However, at present no empirical 
data are reported to substantiate these concerns.36 
 
 31. Arkansas is a leader in this respect. See Arkansas Payment Improvement Initiative 
(APII), ARK. CENTER FOR HEALTH IMPROVEMENT, http://www.achi.net/Pages/OurWork/
Project.aspx?ID=47. 
 32. See, e.g., Donald M. Berwick, Making Good on ACOs’ Promise─The Final Rule for 
the Medicare Shared Savings Program, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1753 (2011), available at 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1111671; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 
15, at 239−42. A recent survey found that the vast majority of ACOs are physician-led or 
jointly led by physicians and hospitals. Carrie H. Colla et al., First National Survey of ACOs 
Finds that Physicians Are Playing Strong Leadership and Ownership Roles, 33 HEALTH AFF. 
964 (2014), available at http://www.statecoverage.org/files/HA_Physicians_in_ACOs_
Survey.pdf (51% of ACOs physician-led, 33% jointly physician- and hospital-led, 3% solely 
hospital-led; but surgeons reluctant to participate). 
 33. See, e.g., John Reichard, New Savings Figures Buoy Hopes for Potential of Medi-
care ACOs, WASH. HEALTH POL’Y WEEK IN REV., Feb. 3, 2014 (reporting preliminary savings 
of about $400 million the first year, shared by providers and the Medicare program), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/newsletters/washington-health-policy-in-
review/2014/feb/february-3-2014/new-savings-figures-buoy-hopes-for-potential-of-medicare-
acos; J. Michael McWilliams et al., Changes in Patients’ Experiences in Medicare Accounta-
ble Care Organizations, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1715 (2014) (finding cost savings and some 
quality improvements in Medicare ACOs); Lawrence P. Casalino, Accountable Care Organi-
zations—The Risk of Failure and the Risks of Success, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1750 (2014) 
(noting positive results of McWilliams study, supra, and other studies). 
 34. See, e.g., John Reichard, CMS Letter on Quality Standards Aims to Keep Pioneer 
ACOs from Bolting, WASH. HEALTH POL’Y WEEK IN REV., Apr. 29, 2013 (reporting pioneer 
ACOs’ objections to costly federal standards), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
publications/newsletters/washington-health-policy-in-review/2013/apr/apr-29-2013/cms-
letter-on-quality-standards. 
 35. ACO proponents respond that these latter concerns should be mitigated by the fact 
that physicians, not insurers, occupy a leadership role in ACOs, so physicians’ training and 
ethic of patient care should serve to keep quality-of-care principles at the forefront. Much 
may depend, however, on the confidence that ACO leaders have in the accuracy of risk ad-
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To succeed in the endeavor of reducing low-value, high-cost services, 
what providers and their patients need is good comparative information 
about both outcomes and costs: what treatments and procedures are superior 
in clinical effectiveness, and what treatments and procedures are cost-
effective. That kind of information is surprisingly hard to come by.37 
Addressing the problems of excessive practice variation and the preva-
lence of high-cost, low-value services and products, health reform advocates 
proposed creation of a Comparative Effectiveness Research Institute to clar-
ify and publicize evidence about best clinical practices. With power to influ-
ence Medicare payment decisions, reform advocates argued, the Compara-
tive Effectiveness Research Institute could be “the silver crowbar to bend 
the healthcare cost curve without compromising quality.”38 
As a rational health policy plan, the Comparative Effectiveness Re-
search Institute proposal had much to recommend it. As a political matter, 
however, the proposal generated a storm of controversy.39 Opponents ex-
pressed fears that such an entity would foist cookbook, “one-size-fits-all” 
medicine on the public. They raised fears that the entity would ration care—
that it would shut off payments for treatment modalities preferred by doctors 
and patients but disfavored by cost-conscious bureaucrats, thereby restrict-
ing physician autonomy and undercutting biomedical innovation.40 Oppo-
nents charged that the entity might arrive at these decisions through secre-
tive unaccountable processes. They expressed fears that it would undervalue 
the lives of the old, the disabled, and the terminally ill—the specter of Sarah 
Palin’s “death panels.”41 
 
justment techniques used in setting ACO achievement benchmarks. Personal communication 
from Mark McClellan, Director, Health Care Innovation & Value Initiative, Brookings Insti-
tution, Washington DC, in Tokyo, Japan, July 7, 2014. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See CHERNEW & FENDRICK, supra note 22. 
 38. Eleanor D. Kinney, Prospects for Comparative Effectiveness Research under Feder-
al Health Reform, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 79, 84 (2012) [hereinafter Kinney, Prospects]. 
 39. For a comprehensive analysis of the development of comparative effectiveness re-
search, its incorporation into the 2010 health reform law, its potential for transforming health 
care, and the concerns it has raised among various stakeholders in the health care market-
place, see Eleanor D. Kinney, Comparative Effectiveness Research under the Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act: Can New Bottles Accommodate Old Wine? 37 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 522 (2011) [hereinafter Kinney, Old Wine]. 
 40. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. 42, S1883 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon 
Kyl criticizing comparative effectiveness research entities for potentially enabling govern-
ment rationing of health care); Corinna Sorenson et al., The Politics of Comparative Effec-
tiveness Research: Lessons from Recent History, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 139, 140, 142 
(2014) (recounting opposition arguments). 
 41. See Sarah Palin, Statement on the Current Health Care Debate, FACEBOOK (Aug. 7, 
2009, 3:26 PM), https://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=113851103434 (Palin’s Face-
book post raising specter of “Obama’s ‘death panel’”). 
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As Daniel Callahan,42 Elizabeth Weeks Leonard,43 and Alan Maynard44 
among others have pointed out, the idea of top-down rationing is unpopular 
on this side of the Atlantic. Public opinion research has amply documented 
Americans’ relative distrust of government, compared, for example, with 
European nations with a strong history of government involvement in health 
care, such as the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries.45 
What to keep in mind, however, is that we Americans ration health care 
anyway. At one level, we ration it by limited access to health insurance.46 At 
a second level, we ration it by insurance company employees deciding 
which treatments get paid for, and which are not covered by the insurance 
policy.47 Limited resources and high demand inevitably result in rationing of 
one kind or another; rationing of health care cannot be avoided. The ques-
tion is how it should be done. 
Notwithstanding public reaction against fictional government “death 
panels,” comparative effectiveness research efforts drew support from both 
sides of the aisle, Republicans as well as Democrats. Seeking at least partial 
consensus on this topic amid the contentious ideological debate on the over-
all health reform package, PPACA drafters renamed the new entity. “Com-
parative Effectiveness Research Institute” was thought to raise too many 
hackles, especially among politically active and generous promoters in the 
drug and medical device industries of treatments that might be found lacking 
in comparative effectiveness. So instead, the PPACA drafters dubbed the 
new entity the “Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute” (PCORI).48 
They re-cast the new entity as a non-governmental organization, funded by a 
 
 42. See, e.g., Daniel Callahan, The Graying of America: Challenges and Controversies: 
Must We Ration Health Care for the Elderly? 40 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 10 (2012). 
 43. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Death Panels and the Rhetoric of Rationing, 13 NEV. L.J. 
872 (2013). 
 44. Alan Maynard, Health Care Rationing: Doing It Better in Public and Private Health 
Care Systems, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1103 (2013). 
 45. For a country-by-country overview of public trust levels toward government in the 
European Union, see Report, Future of Europe, TNS OPINION & SOCIAL 22−31 (2012), 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_379_en.pdf (reporting very high trust 
levels in Scandinavian nations and medium levels in the United Kingdom). For statistics on 
declining public trust in government in the United States, see Public Trust in Government, 
1958−2013, PEW RES. CENTER FOR PEOPLE & PRESS (2014), http://www.people-
press.org/2013/10/18/trust-in-government-interactive/. Peter Neumann’s analysis of the issue 
has been influential. Peter J. Neumann, Why Don’t Americans Use Cost-Effectiveness Analy-
sis?, 10 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 308 (2004). 
 46. The 2010 health care reform law, to the extent its access provisions are being im-
plemented by the states, is starting to alleviate this problem. 
 47. See, e.g., Leonard, supra note 43, at 874−79. 
 48. For accounts of the congressional debate over creation of the new entity, see 
Sorenson et al., supra note 40, at 141−43; Leonard, supra note 43, at 883−86; and Kavita 
Patel, Health Reform’s Tortuous Route to the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute, 
29 HEALTH AFF. 1777 (2010). 
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mixture of public and private money. Its board is composed of four govern-
ment agency representatives and seventeen representatives of private stake-
holders such as patients, providers, insurers, manufacturers, and researchers. 
The law defined the Institute’s mission as to 
assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making in-
formed health decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of evi-
dence concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other 
health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented, diag-
nosed, treated, monitored, and managed through research and evidence 
synthesis that considers variations in patient subpopulations, and the dis-
semination of research findings.
49
 
As part of the political maneuvering to get PPACA passed, Congress 
put rather strict limitations on what PCORI can do with the information it 
gathers.50 The Institute is prohibited from making determinations or even 
recommendations about insurance coverage, and from using the results of its 
research to promote practice guidelines. Nor may the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services use the Institute’s research findings “in a manner that 
treats extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as 
of lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, not 
disabled, or not terminally ill.”51 Another provision of the law prohibits the 
use of the concept of “Quality-Adjusted Life Years” or QALYs,52 a concept 
that is routinely employed53 by health economists, by health policy leaders, 
and by the United Kingdom’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Ex-
cellence,54 but that is specifically off-limits for PCORI’s scientists and 
scholars.55 
 
 49. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301(a), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119, 728 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(c) (2012)). 
 50. One commentator has characterized the result as Congress having “cut [PCORI] off 
at the knees.” Leonard, supra note 43, at 881. See also Maynard, supra note 44, at 1120 (“the 
Obama institute is like a carriage without a horse, as PCORI is not permitted to conduct cost-
effectiveness analyses”). 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1(c) (2012), added by PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 6301(c), 
124 Stat. 740. 
 52. Id. § 1320e-1(e) (2012). 
 53. See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, QALYs and Policy Evaluation: A New Perspective, 6 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 1 (2006). 
 54. See, e.g., Richard Cookson, Can the NICE “End-of-Life Premium” Be Given a Co-
herent Ethical Justification? 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1131, 1132 (2013) (“[t]he specif-
ic metric NICE uses to measure health benefits is the ‘quality adjusted life year (QALY)’”); 
Maynard, supra note 44, at 1122−23. 
 55. For a summary of the limitations on PCORI’s activities, see Kinney, Old Wine, 
supra note 39, at 556−57. See also Peter J. Neumann & Milton C. Weinstein, Legislating 
against Use of Cost-Effectiveness Information, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1495 (2010) (explain-
2014] HEALTH CARE REFORM 619 
The clinical effectiveness of treatment is considered a proper subject 
for the Institute’s research; the cost-effectiveness of treatment is not. Barred 
from direct influence on government reimbursement policy, the new Insti-
tute must fulfill its more limited mission through the effective production, 
gathering, and dissemination of research results to the medical profession 
and the general public. 
There is much that can be accomplished, however, even within that 
limited scope, to rationalize medical practice. PCORI has been up and run-
ning for three years. It has received strong funding56 and has launched al-
most 200 studies “spanning the spectrum of clinical conditions.”57 Its studies 
tend to concern issues of broad applicability, such as preventing fall-related 
injuries in the elderly, interventional pain management, and aligning prima-
ry and specialty care for older adults with complex chronic conditions.58 A 
notable feature of these studies is the involvement of patient and family ad-
visory councils and health systems in their design and governance, with a 
view to enhancing the translation of study results into clinical practice and 
public awareness.59 
It is too early to assess the fruitfulness of PCORI’s activities. As yet, its 
studies are thought to have had little impact, according to a recent survey.60 
And when the studies are completed, they may not directly inform the basis 
of Medicare payment decisions. But the studies’ results will be accompanied 
by publicity to professionals, to the public—and to health insurance compa-
nies, which no doubt will make use of them in private coverage decisions 
and strategies. Moreover, the research PCORI sponsors is complemented by 
a considerable number of private and professional comparative effectiveness 
initiatives, such as the “Choosing Wisely” campaign sponsored by the 
American Board of Internal Medicine.61 If the results of the PCORI-
sponsored studies and their privately sponsored analogues can be incorpo-
 
ing usefulness of cost-per-QALY ratios and lamenting the health reform law’s possible 
“chilling effect” on cost-effectiveness research). 
 56. See Kinney, Prospects, supra note 38, at 83 (noting large congressional authoriza-
tions for comparative effectiveness research). 
 57. Joseph V. Selby & Steven H. Lipstein, PCORI at 3 Years─Progress, Lessons, and 
Plans, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 592, 593 (2014). 
 58. Information about the variety of studies funded is available on the PCORI website, 
http://www.pcori.org/news-room/landing/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2014). 
 59. Harlan M. Krumholz & Joe V. Selby, Seeing through the Eyes of Patients: The Pa-
tient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute Funding Announcements, 157 ANNALS INTERNAL 
MED. 446 (2012). 
 60. See John Reichard, Rapid Payoff from Comparative Effectiveness Research Ques-
tioned, WASH. HEALTH POL’Y WEEK IN REV. (May 27, 2014), http://www.commonwealth
fund.org/publications/newsletters/washington-health-policy-in-review/2014/may/may-27-
2014/rapid-payoff-from-comparative. 
 61. Nancy E. Morden et al., Choosing Wisely—The Politics and Economics of Labeling 
Low-Value Services, 370 NEW ENG. J. MED. 589 (2014). 
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rated into the daily processes of care—no small task—then the wasteful 
inefficiencies plaguing American health care can be at least partially miti-
gated. 
Ours is an information-driven society, relentlessly becoming more so. 
Despite existing barriers (financial, psychological, and ideological) to adop-
tion of treatments proven superior,62 in the long run the evidence should 
have an effect. Bioethicist John Marquis has suggested asking any taxpayer, 
“Should you continue paying taxes to fund expensive treatments lacking 
evidence that they work as well as cheaper available treatments?”63 When 
that conversation takes hold in public discourse, it will build popular support 
for cost-effectiveness as a pillar of health policy. 
 
 
 62. See, e.g., Timbie et al., supra note 25 (suggesting various reasons for slow pace of 
change in clinical practice). 
 63. Marquis’s suggestion is reported in Leonard, supra note 43, at 886. 
